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Financial markets and institutions in the United States have been
undergoing revolutionary changes in recent years. Twenty, or even ten years
ago, many of the financial instruments and institutions that we now take for
granted did not exist. What explains this revolutionary change in the U. S.
financial system and the proliferation of new financial products?
This paper discusses recent developments in U. S. financial markets and
provides an economic analysis of whyvarious recentfinancial innovations have
occurred. This will not only provide us with a better understanding of existing
financial markets in the United States and why they have been undergoing so
much change in recent years, but it also may provide us with clues as to where
our financial system may he heading.
II. The Forces Behind Financial Innovation
Financial institutions develop products to satisfy their own needs as well
as those of their customers. As in other industries, the key driving force
behind innovation is the search for profits. Changes in the economic
environment will stimulate a search for innovations that are likely to be
profitable. From this perspective, it is not surprising that innovations in the
financial industry are stimulated by many of the same factors (changes in
technology and market conditions) that stimulate innovation in other
industries. However, because financial institutions face more restrictive
regulations than most firms in other industries, regulation is an additional
important factor in financial innovation.
Starting in the 1960s, individuals and financial institutions operating in
financial markets in the United States were confronted with drastic changesin the economic environment: Inflation and interest rates climbed sharply and
became harder to predict, while computer technology advanced rapidly.
Financial institutions found that many of the old ways of doing business were
no longer profitable: financial products they had been offering to the public
were not selling. Many financial intermediaries found that they were no
longer able to acquire funds with their traditional financial instruments, and
without these funds they would soon be out of business. In order to survive in
the new economic environment, financial institutions had to research and
develop new products thatwould prove profitable. In their case, necessitywas
the mother of innovation. Even in businesses (financial and otherwise) that
were not threatened by the new economic environment, entrepreneurs
recognized that changes in the financial environment could be profitably
exploited.
To expand on this economic analysis of financial innovation, we now turn
to the specific forces that have been driving financial innovation --changing
market conditions, advances in technology, and regulation --andlook at how
they stimulated the development of new financial products and markets.1
CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS
The most significant change in market conditions in recent years has been
the dramatic increase in the volatility of interest rate movements. In the 1950s
the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills fluctuated between land 3.5%,
while in the 1970s it fluctuated between 4 and 11½ %.Thisvolatilityin interest
rates has become even more pronounced in the l980s, during which the three-
month T-bill rate ranged from 5%toover 15%. Large fluctuations in interest
rates lead to substantial capital gains or tosses on long-term securities and
'For an extensive overview of U.S. financial markets and further discussion of the process of financial
innovation, see Mishkin (1989).3
greater uncertainty about returns on investment. The risk that is related to
the uncertainty about interest rate movements and returns is called interest-
rate risk, and high volatility of interest rates, such as we've seen in the 1970s
and 1980s, leads to a higher level of interest-rate risk.
Since a change in the economic environment would stimulate a search for
profitable innovations, we would expect an increase in interest-rate risk to
spur the creation of new securities and financial markets. For example, a
higher level of interest-rate risk means that debt securities, like long-term
certificates of deposit (CDs), become less attractive to investors because of
their increased risk and so issuers of these securities have to pay higher
interest rates to induce investors to buy them. Financial institutions such as
banks would have great incentives to develop securities with lower interest-
rate risk and thus lower interest rates; the resulting lower interest costs for
acquired funds would lead to higher profits.
Consistent with this analysis was the development of variable-rate
certificates of deposits in 1977 by the Morgan Guaranty Bank (New York).
With a variable-rate CD, an investor is subject to smaller price fluctuations
when interest rates change. Hence they have become quite popular, allowing
Morgan Guaranty and other banks to issue them to obtain more funds at a
lower interest cost and thus earn higher profits.
Like other investors, financial institutions find that lending is more
attractive if interest-rate risk is lower. To reduce interest-rate risk, in 1975
savings and loans in California began to issue adjustable-rate mortgages,
mortgage loans on which the interest rate changes when a market interest rate
changes (usually the Treasury bill rate or a measure of the cost of funds to
California thrift institutions). Because adjustable-rate mortgages allow
mortgage-issuing institutions to earn higher interest rates on mortgages when
rates rise, profits are kept higher during these periods.4
This attractive feature of adjustable-rate mortgages has encouraged
mortgage-issuing institutions often to issue adjustable-rate mortgages with
lower initial interest rates than on conventionalfixed-rate mortgages, making
thempopularwith many households. However, because the mortgage payment
can increase with variable-rate mortgages, many households continue to
prefer fixed-rate mortgages. Hence both types of mortgages are widespread.
Another financial innovation that has stemmed from increased interest-
rate risk is the interest-rate swap. A financial institution may be locked into
assets and liabilities of particular durations because of where its borrowing
and lending expertise lies. However, because of a possible mismatch of
durations, say it has a greater amount of interest rate-sensitive assets than it
has of interest rate-sensitive liabilities, it can be exposed to substantial
interest-rate risk where its profitability and firm value fluctuates with changes
in interest rates. Interest-rate swaps, which first appeared in the eurobond
market in 1981, enable a financial institution that has more interest rate-
sensitive assets than rate-sensitive liabilities to "swap payment streams with
a financial institution that has more rate-sensitive liabilities than rate-
sensitive assets, thereby reducing interest rate risk for both parties. The
beauty of this arrangement is that it does not require either financial
institution to rearrange its balance sheet, making interest-rate swaps a
relatively low-cost way of reducing interest-rate risk. It is no surprise that with
the extremely large amount of interest-rate risk in the 1980s, interest-rate
swaps have become an extremely successful financial innovation.
Increased interest-rate risk has also stimulated the development of new
financial markets in futures, options and related financial products. To
decrease the risk they face, investors were eager to trade in new financial
markets that enable them to reduce their interest-rate risk. Future markets
for commodities such as wheat or pork bellies (the source of bacon), in which
the seller of a contract agrees to provide a certain standardized commodity to5
the buyer on a specified future data at an agreed-upon price, have been
aroundfor along time. Futures markets inwhich the standardized commodity
is a particular type of financial instrument did not exist until 1975. A financial
futures market can enable both buyers and sellers of financial futures
contracts to hedge against interest-rate risk. When interest-rate risk
increased in the 1970s, the ability to hedge this risk became especially
valuable, making it more likely that a large number of investors would he
willing to trade in financial futures markets. In 1975, the Chicago Board of
Trade (in which futures contracts for commodities such as wheat, corn,
soybeans, and oats were already traded) created a futures market in
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) securities.
The GNMA financial futures market was so successful that the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBT) later opened futures markets in long-term U. S.
Treasury bonds and notes, while the International Monetary Market (1MM)
(a subsidiary of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME))organized afutures
market in U. S. Treasury bills, bank CDs, and Eurodollars. The volume of
trading in financial futures markets has grown to an extraordinary extent, and
Treasury bonds and Treasury bills are now among the top ten of the 100 or so
standardized commodities traded in both financial and nonfinancial futures
markets.
Another financial instrument that enables investors to reduce interest-
rate risk is options on debt instruments. An option contract provides the right
to buy (a call option) or sell (a put option) a security at a specified price,
called the exercise or strike price. An option contract in a debt instrument is
like a form of insurance against interest-rate risk because it allows the
investor to pay no more than a certain interest rate if she is a borrower or earn
no less than a certain interest rate if she is a lender.
As we would expect, the increased volatility of interest rates in recent years
has increased the demand for this type of insurance. The Chicago Board6
Options Exchange (CBOE), in which options for stocks had been traded since
1973, initiated trading in options for debt instruments in 1981. Currently, the
CBOE and other exchanges offer options not only for Treasury bonds and
bills, but also for financial futures contracts.
Other changes in market conditions have been important to innovation in
the financial marketplace. In 1975, the SEC disallowed the rules that set
minimum brokerage commissions in organized stock exchanges. The sharp
drop in brokerage commissions that occurred thereafter was especially
pronounced for traders of large blocks of stocks, pension funds and mutual
funds. The cheaper costs for these institutional investors meant that they
became a more important force in the marketplace. In addition, with the
recognition by many small investors that mutual funds have a hard time
beating the market, index funds (mutual funds that focus on producing returns
similar to those on broad market indexes) became increasingly popular. The
increased importance of institutional investors along with their increased
attention on tracking market indexes led to an increased demand for a more
liquid market in a basket of stocks that track the market. Given this need in
the marketplace, a natural extension to the already successful markets in
financialfutures was the development of futures trading in stock price indexes
at the CBT, the CME, the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT), and the New
York Futures Exchange (NYFE), a subsidiary of the New York Stock
Exchange. The popularity of these markets has also been stimulated by their
ability to help lower risk for stock market mutual and pension funds through
dynamic hedging strategies (often referred to as portfolio insurance).
Another important change in market conditions has been trend towards
increased corporate indebtedness, which accelerated sharply in the 1980s.
The underlying reasons why an increasing amount of financing has been done
by borrowing rather than through issuing equity is somewhat unclear.
Increased indebtedness can be related to takeover activity and financial7
reorganization such as leveraged buyouts. but we are not sure why takeovers
and financial reorganizations have increased. Some economists view
increased indebtedness as a positive development because they believe that
it creates better incentives for managers and because takeovers help throw out
weak management and replace it with stronger management.2 With this view,
it is possible to think that the increased need and desire to make American
firms more competitive in the face of increased competition from abroad has
stimulated takeovers and financial reorganizations that have increased
corporate indebtedness. Other economists see the trend towards higher
corporate indebtedness in a much less favorable light.3 Rather it may stem
from U. S. tax laws which overly favor debt over equity financing because of
the deductibility of interest income, laxer enforcement of anti-trust
regulations, or an irrational frenzy of takeover activity that might actually be
harmful to the economy. Regardless of the reasons, the increased desire to
finance with corporate debt rather than equity made it more likely that
borrowers with lower credit ratings wanted access to the corporate bond
market.
Before the 1980s, investment banks would only market new public issues
of corporate bonds with investment grade' bond ratings of Baa or above.
Some firms that had fallen on bad times, so-called fallen angels, had corporate
bond with ratings below Baa, and these bonds were pejoratively dubbed "junk
bonds'. In 1977, Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham sought an outlet for the
increased desire of some firms to borrow in the corporate bond market by
pioneering the concept of selling new public issues of junk bonds, not for
fallen angels, but rather for companies that had not yet achieved investment-
grade status. Since 1977, junk bonds have become an important factor in the
'See Jensen (1988), for example.
'Friedman (1986) and Kaufman (1986),for example.8
corporate bond market, with over $200 billion of junk bonds publicly issued
by American corporations. Indeed, the development of this new market may
have been an important stimulus to corporate indebtedness.
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY
The development of new technology can stimulate financial innovation by
lowering the cost of providing new financial services and instruments and
making it profitable to offer them to the public. When new computer
technology that substantially lowered the cost of processing financial
transactions became available, financial institutions conceived new financial
services and instruments dependent on this technology. Three important
examples where computer technology has played an important role are
securitization, the internationalization of financial markets and program
trading.
Securitization is the process of transforming otherwise illiquid financial
assets into marketable capital market instruments.With computer
recordkeeping, financial institutions find that they can cheaply bundle
together a portfolio of loans (such as mortgages) with small denominations,
collect the interest and principal payments, and then "pass them through" (pay
them out) to a third party. The claims to these interest and principal payments
can thus be sold to a third party as a security, and the financial institution
makes a profit by servicing the securitized loans (collecting the interest and
principal payments and paying them out) and charging a fee. Securitization
first started in the 1970s with the mortgage-backed securities developed by the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), and mortgage-backed
securities continue to be the predominant form of securitization.
Securitization of mortgages has been expanded enormously; two-thirds of all9
residential mortgages are now securitized, and there are over $500 billion of
securitized mortgages outstanding.
Securitization has not stopped with mortgages, however: Securitization of
automobile loans, credit-card receivables, and commercial and computer
leases began in the mid-1980s. Securitized automobile loans with only
$900 million issued in 1985 grew to a market of $10 billion by 1986. Experts
predict that nonmortgage securitization will be a market of over $100 billion
within the next few years.
Computer technology also has enabled financial institutions to tailor
securitization to produce securities that have payment streams considered
especially desirable by the market. Collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs), which are bonds that pass through the payments from a portfolio of
mortgages, are a good example of such tailoring. Computerization enables
a CMO to be spilt into four classes or "tranches." The first three classes
receive interest payments according to the coupon rate on the CMO, with
class 1 first receiving all principal payments .9d prepayments from the
collateralized pool of mortgages. After the class I bonds are paid off, the
principal payments and prepayments are used to retire sequentially the
remaining classes of bonds. The fourth class, called the "accrual" or "Z" bond,
receives interest and principal payments only after the other three classes are
paid off. The CMO has the advantage of containing bonds of both short
maturity (class 1) and long maturity (class 3 or Z), thus increasing its potential
market.
Although securitization could not take place without modern computer
technology (think of the cost of trying to collect payments and paying them out
by hand), technology is not the only factor encouraging it; the government has
played an important role too. Securitization first started with GNMA
guarantees of mortgage payments and even today involves mostly assets
directly or indirectly guaranteed by the government. Tax rules also have10
stimulated new securitized instruments. A change of IRS regulations made
possible real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs). which are
essentially CMOs with a more favorable tax treatment.
Computer technology has also been central to the now very controversial
financial innovation, program trading. Program trading involves compute r-
directed trading between the stock index futures and the stocks whose prices
are reflected in the stock price index. Program trades are conducted to keep
stock index futures and stock prices in line with each other (a process called
arbitrage). For example, when the price of the stock index futures contract is
far below the prices of the underlying stocks in the index, program trades buy
index futures and sell the stocks. Critics of program trading assert that it has
led to substantial increases in marketvolatility, especially in such episodes as
the Black Monday Crash on October 19, 1987, or the recent 190 point decline
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on Friday, October 13, 1989 (most of
which occurred in the last hour of trading). However, others do not accept the
hypothesis that program tradingincreases stock marketvolatility because they
believe that the prices of stock index futures primarily reflect the same
economic forces that move stock prices --thechanges in the market's
underlying assessment of the value of stocks.
Computers and advanced telecommunications are also a driving factor
behind the internationalization of financial markets. One recent innovation
is the development of Euroequities, new stock issues that are sold primarily
to institutional traders abroad. Technology has clearly played a role in the
development of this market since it enables dealers to use the latest
technology to transmit share prices and information instantaneously around
the world. Another innovation is that dealers in New York or Tokyo are not
constrained by the hours of organized exchanges; they can trade at any time
of day or night. The low cost of international communications is making it
easier to invest abroad, and we are rapidly moving to a world in which stocks11
and bonds are traded internationally twenty-four hours a day.
The impact of advanced telecommunications on the internationalization
of financial markets was most dramatically illustrated by the events during the
Black Monday Crash of 1987. Just before the crash on October 19, 1987, there
were substantial declines in foreign stock markets. As a result, there were
huge sell orders at the U. S. markets' openings on October 19 and stock prices
on the U. S. exchanges plummeted. Then the crash in U. S. stocks was
transmitted to foreign markets which experienced declines of similar
magnitude. For better or for worse, we now live in a world of highly integrated
financial markets in which we often boom or bust together.
REGULATION
Thus far we've seen that financial innovation can arise from changing
market conditions and the exploitation of new technology.Similarly,
regulation can lead to financial innovation by creating incentives to develop
legal ways to avoid the restrictive effects of regulation. Our analysis of
innovation suggests that when regulatory constraints are so burdensome that
large profits can be made by avoiding them, innovations are more likely to
occur.
Because the banking industry is one of the most heavily regulated
industries in America, it is an industry in which such innovations are especially
likely to occur. The rise in inflation and interest rates from the late 1960s to
1980 made the regulatory constraints imposed on this industry even more
burdensome. Under these circumstances, we would expect the pace of
financial innovations in banking to be rapid, and, indeed, it has been.
Two sets of regulations seriously restrict the ability of banks to make
profits: (1) reserve requirements which force banks to keep a certain fraction
of their deposits as reserves, and (2) restrictions on the interest rates that can12
be paid on deposits.
The key to understanding why reserve requirement affect financial
innovation is to recognize that they act, in effect, as a tax on deposits. Since
the Federal Reserve does not pay interest on reserves, the cost of holding
them is the interest that a bank could earn by lending the reserves out. This
cost imposed on the bank is just like a tax on bank deposits which sometimes
can be avoided by producing a new financial innovation.
A second set of regulations that has stimulated financial innovation are
restrictions on the interest rates that can be paid on deposits Until 1980,
banking legislation prohibited banks (except in a few states) from paying
interest on checking account deposits and, through Regulation Q, the Federal
Reserve set maximum limits on the interest rate that could be paid on time
deposits. The desire to avoid these restrictions on interest rates paid on
deposits (called deposit rate ceilings) also produced financial innovations.
If market interest rates rose above the maximUm rates that banks paid on
time deposits under Regulation Q, depositors withdrew funds from banks to
put them into higher-yielding securities. This loss of deposits from the
banking system restricted the amount of funds that banks could lend (called
financial disintermediation).
The desire to avoid restrictions on interest payments and the "tax' from
reserve requirements led to several important financial innovations in the
1970s, specifically interest bearing checking accounts and money market
mutual funds.
The rise in interest rates in the late 1960s, which made the avoidance of
restrictions on deposit rates more profitable, stimulated the development of
new types of checking accounts. Because of Regulation Q ceilings, savings and
loans and mutual savings banks were especially hard hit by the rise in interest
rates in the late 60s. They lost large amounts of funds to financial instruments
that paid higher interest rates, and they needed to find new sources of funds13
to continue to make profitable loans.
In 1970, a mutual savings bank in Massachusetts discovered a loophole in
the prohibition of interest payments on checking accounts. In effect, by
calling a check a negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW), accounts on which
these NOWs could be written were not legally checking accounts (even though
they looked, smelled, and tasted like a checking account). Thus NOW
accounts were not subject to regulations on checking accounts and could pay
interest. In May of 1972, after two years of litigation, mutual savings banks in
Massachusetts were allowed to issue NOW accounts that paid interest.
Subsequently, in September of 1972, the courts approved NOW accounts in
New Hampshire.
NOW accounts were immediately successful in New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, and they enabled savings and loans and mutual savings banks
in those states to attract more funds which could be loaned out. Since
commercial banks did not want competition from other financial
intermediaries for checking account deposits (at the time only commercial
banks were legally allowed to issue checking accounts), they mounted a
campaign to prevent the spread of these accounts to other states. The result
was congressional legislation enacted in January of 1974 that limited NOW
accounts to New England. Legislation in 1980 finally authorized NOW
accounts nationwide for savings and loans, mutual savings banks and
commercial banks, while similar accounts at credit unions (share draft
accounts) were authorized for credit unions.
Another innovation that enabled banks to effectively pay interest on
checking accounts is the ATS (automatic-transfer savings) account. Here a
checking account automatically has balances above a certain amount
transferred into a savings account that pays interest. When a check is written
on the ATS account, the necessary funds to cover the check are automatically
transferred from the savings account into the checking account. Thus balances14
earning interest in a savings account are effectively part of the depositor's
checking account because they are available for writing checks. Legally,
however, it is the savings account and not the checking account that pays
interest to the depositor.
The prohibition, of interest on checking accounts is no longer an issue for
the accounts of individuals but is for corporate accounts. Commercial banks
provide a variant of the ATS account to their corporate depositors, which
involves the use of a "sweep account" to engage in overnight repurchase
agreements (RPs). In this type of arrangement any balances above a certain
amount in a corporation's checking account at the end of a business day are
"swept out of the account" and are invested in overnight RPs that pay the
corporation interest. Again, although the checking account does not legally
pay interest, in effect the corporation is receiving interest on balances that are
available for writing checks.
The financial innovations of ATS accounts and overnight RP arrangements
were stimulated not only by deposit rate ceilings, but also by new technology.
Without low-cost computers to process inexpensively the additional
transactions required by these accounts, neither of these innovations would
be profitable and therefore would not have been developed. Technological
factors often combine with other incentives, such as the desire to get around
restrictions on deposit rates, to produce financial innovations.
The desire to avoid deposit rate ceilings and the "tax" on deposits imposed
by reserve requirements also led to the development of money market mutual
funds, a new financial institution that sells a new financial instrument. Money
market mutualfunds issue shares that are redeemable at a fixed price (usually
$1) by writing checks and uses these funds to invest in short-term money
market securities (Treasury bills, certificates of deposit, commercial paper).
Although money market fund shares effectively function as checking account
deposits that earn interest, they are not legally deposits and so are not subject15
to reserve requirements or prohibitions on interest payments. For this reason
they can pay higher interest rates than deposits at banks.
The first money market mutual fund was created by two Wall Street
mavericks, Bruce Bent and Henry Brown, in 1971. However, the low market
interest rates from 1971 to 1977 (which were just slightly above Regulation Q
ceilings of 51/4to Ss%) kept money market mutual funds from initially
becoming a success because their interest rates were not particularly
advantageous relative to those on bank deposits. In early 1978, the situation
changed rapidly as market interest rates began to climb over 10%, well above
the 5%maximuminterest rates payable on savings accounts and time
deposits under Regulation Q. In 1977, money market mutual funds had assets
under $4 billion; in 1978, their assets climbed to close to $10 billion, in 1979.
to over $40 billion; and in 1982, to $230 billion. Currently, their assets exceed
$300 billion even though bank interest rates are no longer restricted by
Regulation Q.
III. The Impact of Financial Innovation on Regulation
Just as financial institutions change in response to regulation, the
regulatory authorities change their regulations in response to financial
innovation. This process can be thought of as a "cat and mouse" game between
the financial institutions and the regulators in which they adapt continually to
each other.
Two major objectives of the regulatory authorities have governed their
response to financial innovation in the last twenty years:(1) the
encouragement of home ownership, as reflected in attempts by the regulatory
authorities to ensure flows of funds into mortgage-issuing institutions; and
(2) the encouragement of stability in the financial system, as reflected in the16
attempts to prevent hank failures.
BANK REGULATION IN THE 1970S
Once market interest rates began to rise above the Regulation Q ceilings
on deposit rates in the late 1960s and 1970s, funds began to leave depository
institutions, particularly the savings and loans and mutual savings banks.
Because savings and loans and mutual savings banks were the most important
issuers of residential mortgages, their loss of deposits meant that there were
fewer funds available to issue residential mortgages. Therefore, in order to
encourage the flow of funds into these mortgage-issuing institutions,
Regulation 0 ceilings were set to allow savings and loans and mutual savings
banks to pay slightly higher interest rates (by one-quarter of one percent) on
their time deposits than commercial banks could pay on theirs. In addition,
to put everyone on a more equal footing, deposit rate ceilings were extended
to previously unregulated institutions such as credit unions.
Regulators also pursued a second strategy to discourage financial market
instruments that would compete with deposits. They convin'ed the U. S.
Treasury in 1970 to raise the minimum denomination on Treasury bills to
$10,000,sothat small savers would be forced to put their savings into savings
and loans and mutual savings banks. In addition they encouraged bank
holding companies and corporations not to issue small-denomination debt.
This strategy discriminated against small savers (typically low-income) who
were prevented from earning market interest rates. Large savers (typically
high-income), on the other hand, had sufficient resources to buy large-
denomination securities and earn market interest rates.
Although deposit rate ceilings worked in the short run to provide funds to
the mortgage-issuing institutions, financial innovation worked to undo these
regulations. In the late 1970s the success of money market mutual funds and17
overnight repurchase agreements was causing mortgage-issuing institutions
to lose so many deposits that their financial health was severely threatened.
By 1980, despite regulations to help the savings and loans and mutual
savings banks, the continuing rise in interest rates left them in even deeper
financial trouble, and commercial banks were threatened as well. A major
financial reform was needed and it came in the form of congressional
legislation --theDepository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980.
DEREGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE 1980s
As often happens with major legislation, an attempt is made to please as
many opposing parties as possible to enhance the chances of passage. An
important intent of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DLDMCA)of l98Owas to help the mortgage-issuing institutions
(savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks). These institutions
were allowed to compete more effectively against commercial banks by
allowing them wider latitude in the loans they could make. Savings and loans,
for example, whose loans had effectively been restricted to mortgages, were
now allowed to invest up to 20% of their assets in consumer loans, commercial
paper, and corporate bonds. Mutual savings banks were allowed to make
commercial loans up to 5%oftheir assets and were allowed to open checking
accounts in connection with these loans. In addition, savings and loans were
allowed to expand into new lines of business such as trust services and credit
cards.
DIDMCA also approved NOW and ATS accounts nationwide at all deposi-
tory institutions, thereby allowing all of these institutions to compete more18
effectively against money market mutual funds. It also mandated a phaseout
of Regulation Q. completed by 1986, and set up a Depository Institutions
Deregulation Committee to supervise the phaseout. The provisions of
DIDMCA not only had advantages for the mortgage-issuing institutions, but
also benefited commercial banks and credit unions, thus garnering their
support for this legislation. These provisions were popular with the public
since they allowed depositors to earn higher interest payments on their
deposits.
Other provisions of DIDMCA involved the elimination of usury ceilings
(maximum interest rates) on mortgage loans and the elimination of usury
ceilings for three years on certain business and agricultural loans. Finally,
DIDMCA imposed uniform reserve requirements on all depository institutions
and allowed all of these institutions access to Federal Reserve facilities, such
as the discount window and Fed check-clearing. This final set of provisions
put all of these institutions on an equal footing and made them more subject
to control by the Fed.
The expansion of NOW and ATS account deposits after they were
authorized by DIDMCA starting in 1981 was dramatic, with the amount of
these deposits increasing from $27 billion to $101 billion from 1980 to 1982.
However, since the Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings were being phased out
gradually and market interest rates climbed to record levels in 198 1-1982,
money market funds continued to grow rapidly (averaging $76 billion in 1980
and $230 billion in 1982). As a result, savings and loans and mutual savings
banks were losing deposits at the same time that the cost of their acquired
funds climbed higher. The result was an unprecedented (for the post-war
period) number of failures of these institutions. Thus further reform
legislation was needed to help these institutions.
In October of 1982, the Depository Institutions (Garn-St Germain) Actwas
passed in order to deal with the immediate emergency stemming from the19
unprecedented number of failures of savings and loans and mutual savings
banks (over 250in1982). To compete more effectively with money market
funds, depository institutions were allowed to offer money market deposit
accounts (MMDAs) which provide services comparable to money market
mutual funds and are not subject to Regulation Q ceilings or reserve require-
ments. Since depository institutions are able to pay high interest rates on
these accounts, they have become immensely popular: By the end of 1984,
MMDA deposits had grown to over $400 billion and now exceed $500 billion.
The Garn-St Germain Act had additional provisions to help savings and
loans and mutual savings banks. By 1984 federally chartered savings and loans
and mutual savings banks were allowed to invest up to 10% of their assets in
commercial loans, and the maximum amount of consumer lending was raised
to 30% of their assets. Because the provisions put these institutions on a more
equalfooting with commercial banks, the Garn-St Germain Act required that
from 1984 on, Regulation 0 ceilings should be applied equally to all
depository institutions until they expired in 1986.
A final set of provisions was designed to assist the federal deposit
insurance agencies in dealing with the emergency situation due to bank
failures. For example, they were given emergency powers to merge troubled
institutions across state lines or to merge thrift institutions (mutual savings
banks and savings and loans) into commercial banks.
Another element in the deregulation of the financial system in the 1980s
has been the crumbling of the regulatory barriers separating the banking and
the securities industry. Before 1933, investment banking and commercial
banking often were conducted by the same institution. The combination of
investment and commercial banking led to potential conflicts of interest,
especially in the operation of bank trust departments. After the bank failures
of 1930-1933 and the public uproar over documented cases of abuses by bank
trust departments, political pressure developed to eliminate conflicts of20
interest and to promote a banking system less prone to failure. in response to
this pressure, Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which
prohibited commercial banks from engaging in the underwriting and dealing
of corporate securities (commercial banks were allowed to sell new issues of
government securities) and limited banks to the purchase of debt securities
approved by the bank regulatory agencies. Likewise, it prohibited investment
banks from engaging in commercial banking activities. In effect the Glass-
Steagall Act separated the activities of commercial banks from the securities
industry.
Financial innovations such as money market mutual funds and cash
management accounts at brokerage firms (which provide a package of
financial services that includes credit cards, immediate loans, check-writing
privileges, automatic investment of proceeds from the sale of securities into
a money market mutual fund, and unified record keeping) have enabled the
securities industry to engage in activities traditionally carried out by
commercial banks. Even nonfinancial firms such as Sears have encroached on
banks' business: they have developed 'financial supermarkets" in which the
services of several financial institutions can be obtained under one roof.
Partially in response to these developments which have lowered bank
profitability, the bank regulatory agencies have been allowing banks to engage
in traditional investment banking activities, such as underwriting commercial
paper, mortgage-backed securities, municipal revenue bonds and other
securities. Banks are also now allowed to sell first-mortgage life insurance
and to share certain fieldswith insurance companies. The separation between
banking and securities activities is rapidly becoming a thing of the past.21
IV.The Crisis in Banking and the Current Reregufation Trend
Theneteffect of deregulation in the t980s along with the rapid pace of
financial innovation has been to make the financial system as a whole more
competitive: All depository institutions are treated more equally and the
distinctions between the different depository institutions and between the
banking industry and the securities industry have become blurred. Although
this result of deregulation has been beneficial, deregulation has led to some
disastrous consequences. Specifically it has led to the banking crisis of recent
years, which has been most serious for the savings and loans industry.
Although federal deposit insurance provided by such agencies as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has the important benefit of
protecting depositors from losses when banks fail, thereby making it less likely
that banking panics, such as those in the 1930s, occur, it suffers from what is
known as "moral hazard". Moral hazard occurs when the existence of
insurance encourages insured parties to take greater risks because they know
that they are protected by their insurance. Because insured depositors know
that they will not suffer losses (up to $100,000) if a bank fails, they do not
impose the discipline of the marketplace on risk-taking banks by withdrawing
deposits when they suspect that the bank is headed for trouble. Consequently,
banks with deposit insurance can (and do) take on greater risks than they
otherwise would.
With the tide of financial innovation and deregulation of the banking
system in the early 1980s, the moral hazard problems of deposit insurance
worsened. The proliferation of newfinancial instruments and markets and the
diminished regulatory restrictions on banks has made it far easier for banks
to engage in risk-taking activities. Not surprisingly, commercial bank failures
increased dramatically. From 1945 to 1980, commercial bank failures
averaged less than ten per year. Since 1981, the number of commercial bank22
failures has climbed steadily, and have been currently running at the rate of
200 a year.
If the situation has been bad in the commercial banking industry, it has
been far worse in the savings and loan industry. Deregulation meant that
savings and loans were now allowed to depart from their traditional loan
activity in residential mortgages, a fairly staid business, and engage in risky
investment activities forwhich theywere often ill equipped. The moral hazard
problem thus became even more severe for savings and loans. A bad situation
was made even worse by the shortage of funds for the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the deposit insurance agency for the
savings and loan industry. Because the FSLIC did not have the funds to
liquidate insolvent banks, it was unable to close many of these banks down and
continued to let them operate. These insolvent but still operating S&Ls now
had even greater moral hazard. Such an institution had nothing to lose by
taking on great risk and "betting the bank": if it gets lucky, it gets out of
insolvency, and if its not, the deposit insurance agency has to absorb the
further losses. The outcome of this process has been huge losses among a
large number of savings and loans. At the end of 1988, over a quarter of the
savings and loans were either insolvent or on the brink of insolvency.'
After passing bank legislation in 1987 that raised only $10.8 billion for the
FSLIC, a completely inadequate figure for cleaning up the savings and loan
mess, Congress finally passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. This act which abolished the FSLIC
and placed its activities under the control of the FDIC, will attempt to resolve
the savings and loan crisis by committing an estimated $166 billion in the next
ten years for a new government agency, the Resolution Trust Corporation,
which will close and dispose of the insolvent S&Ls.
For an excellent discussion of the forces behind the crisis in federal deposit insurance, see Kane
(1985).23
An important feature of the 1989 legislation is that it has increased the
regulation of the savings and loan industry. It substantially raises capital
requirements for the savings and loans, restricts their investment activities,
and places the responsibility for monitoring the industry with the FDIC, a
much tougher regulator than the now defunct FSLLC. Even with the
substantial reregulation of the savings and loan industry, manyeconomists feel
that the reregulation does not nearly go far enough and that a savings and loan
insolvency crisis may pop up again in the future.
The trend to reregulation has also arisen for the commercial banking
industry. Capital requirements have also been increased for commercial
banks, and new capital requirements for risky bank activities that may not
appear on the bank balance sheet have also been proposed. In our current,
dynamic world of new financial markets, which has been driven by financial
innovation, there are growing opportunities for risk taking. This is likely to
mean increased regulation by our regulatory agencies in order to minimize the
moral hazard problem of deposit insurance.
The financial instability in the banking system in recent years has also led
to worries about the overall health in the financial system. Thus, the trend to
more regulation in the banking industry may also be accompanied by
additional regulation in other areas of the financial system. Concern about
increased stock market volatility has led to calls for restrictions on program
trading, and by some, even an outright ban on stock index futures markets.
There are also calls for restrictions on the issuance of junk bonds, which are
controversial because they have frequently been used to finance corporate
takeovers and are a factor in the increasing level of corporate indebtedness
which some fear could lead to a financial collapse.5 Where the 1980s have
been an era of financial deregulation, the 1990s look like they may swing in
the other direction.
'An excellent discussionofthese issues is contained in Bernanke and Campbell (1988).24
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